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THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
ATTEMPTS TO LEGISLATE TASTE IN MORAL AND
POLITICAL BELIEFS*

Samuel D. Estepf
a nutshell, the topic of this paper is "Comstockery and the
Bowdlerizing of Ideas." The thesis here asserted is that the
Rule of Law is violated when legislatures succumb to modern attempts by the often pathologically-motivated zealot legally to
freeze current tastes in moral and political beliefs. The relationship between taste statutes and the seemingly esoteric topic, "The
Legislative Process and the Rule of Law," is based on the premise
that the maximum possible degree of intellectual freedom for each
individual is an essential ingredient in the legal system of a civilized
society.
Archibald MacLeish, although addressing himself to a somewhat different topic, has beautifully stated this concept of individual intellectual freedom which should be considered a part
of the Rule of Law.1 In speaking of the national purpose which
is the basic foundation of the Declaration of Independence and of
the United States Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, he
said that "prior to July 4th, 1776, the national purpose of nations
had been to dominate: to dominate at least their neighbors and
rivals and, wherever possible, to dominate the world. The American national purpose was the opposite: to liberate from domination; to set men free." He goes on to say that this is what is sometimes referred to as "the American Dream. We were dedicated
from our beginnings to the proposition that we existed not merely
to exist but also to be free, and the dedication was real in spite of
the fact that it took us three generations and a bloody war to practice our preachment within our 01rn frontiers. It was real in spite
of the fact that its practice is still a delusion in numerous pockets
of hypocrisy across the nation." He continues, "And America did
move steadily on before it lost headway in the generation in which
we live. The extraordinary feel of liveness that the Americans
communicated, whether agreeably or not, to their early European
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• Lecture delivered on June 28, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general
topic, "Post-War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor,
June 20 - July 1, 1960. -Ed.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1 MacLeish, National Purpose: MacLeish "Dream,'' N.Y. Times, May 30, 1960, p. 14,
col. I.
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visitors came from that sense of national expectation. We were
never a very philosophical people politically after Jefferson and
his contemporaries left us. We were practical men who took instruction from the things we saw and heard and did. But the purpose defined in our Declaration was a reality to us notwithstanding. It gave us aim as the Continent gave us scope, and the old
American character with its almost anarchic passion for idosyncrasy
and difference was the child of both." He then makes a statement
which is peculiarly appropriate in considering the type of statute
here discussed. He says, "The truth is, of course, that freedom is
never an accomplished fact. It is always a process. Which is why
the drafters of the Declaration spoke of the pursuit of happiness:
They knew their Thucydides and therefore knew that 'the secret of
happiness is freedom and the secret of freedom, courage.' The
only way freedom can be defended is not by fencing it in but by
enlarging it~ exercising it." [Emphasis added.]
Actually matters of taste in moral and political beliefs cannot
be handled adequately by legislative action. Statutory enactments
not only tend to mislead society into thinking that the problem is
solved, but they also indicate that a society has lost faith in itself.
They paint, for the world to see, a picture not of intellectual freedom and enthusiasm for the morrow, but of an intellectual decadence which others care not to copy. The value judgments
underlying these statutes are open to serious question and we must
not let ourselves be stampeded or panicked into thinking we can
legislate taste in the expression of beliefs, moral or political. These
are taught by example, and history tells us that they change. We
must be willing to hear new ideas, and to condone the actions of
those we find objectionable only as a matter of taste. The Comstocks of today must not be allowed to emasculate our intellectual
vigor merely because thoughts are couched in terms found distasteful to some or even to a temporary majority. A legislative
Rule of Law should be that the mind (although not necessarily
all the actions) of man should be free!
When seen in proper historical perspective, the folly or at least
futility of enacting such taste statutes becomes obvious. The
thesis here propounded, however, is that the kinds of modern
statutes criticized in this discussion are not only as futile as some
of the humorous historical examples to be described, but, more
importantly, also run counter to the concept of individual intellectual freedom, which is-or ought to be-part of our Rule of Law.
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Before describing the old, however, and then cataloging the
new taste statutes whose enactment the legal profession should oppose, several matters of definition and caution must be mentioned,
including a definition of the Rule of Law.

I.

DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW

Most of the writing resulting from the recent resurgence of
interest in the Rule of Law, to the extent that a definition in general terms is attempted, seems to be rather sterile mental gymnastics. At best, the Mad Hatter's suggestion to Alice is appropriate-the Rule of Law seems to mean what each individual using
the term wants it to mean. For present purposes it is defined as
follows: A search for the Rule of Law is man's attempt to determine with some degree of rationality the basic value judgments
which should determine the actions and attitudes he will legally
enforce or prohibit, encourage or discourage. Meaningful exploration of the topic for almost all persons starts and ends with
attempts to identify the specific values which the law should foster.
Quixotic tilting at generalities is tempting but almost never rewarding.
Even the source from which these basic values are derived is
not our concern. Many, including the writer, think they come
from the minds of men, including not only his ability to think but
also to feel. Even those who assert that there is a divinely-inspired,
or perhaps a divinely-determined set of rules, must admit that these
rules are communicated to the rest of us through the tongue and
pen of man, and the possibility of error in the transcription is
obvious. The search for the immutable, everlasting verities must
continue. But the searcher should be most reluctant to assume
that he or anyone else at any one time has discovered what such
verities are, or at least how they should be applied to individual
situations at any specific period in history. Each legislative enactment's desirability should be tested against the best thinking at
the time as to what the basic values of our society are. It is here
suggested that taste statutes constitute an encroachment upon the
basic value of individual intellectual freedom, and that lawyers
should therefore try to convince legislators that society loses more
than it gains by such enactments. These losses include not only
the loss of intellectual freedom, but a potentially greater loss in
that the statutes strain the limits of the legal system as an effective
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tool of social control and thus tend to weaken the system in the
area where it must operate to maintain order.
Most of the types of legislation to be discussed have been
treated separately in legal periodicals, but typically with emphasis
only on constitutional limitations on governmental actions. In
many of these cases a constitutional question of some significance
is involved, but here our interest is much broader. In considering
the Rule of Law and its meaning for our legal system, there should
be an affirmative character to such analysis far beyond the negative
prohibition found in most of our constitutional concepts limiting
the power of the government to control the individual in society.
All citizens, and particularly the members of the legal profession,
have a responsibility to see that the legislature concerns itself with
things vital to our society and which can appropriately be dealt
with by statute. The legislature should not be permitted to become so absorbed in prohibiting that its enactments are unimaginative and ineffective in dealing with important problems.

II.

THE ROLE OF THE BAR

Lawyers as a group have given too little attention to the legislative process which today is the most vital part of our legal system
of social controls.2 We have concentrated on the legal rules imposed by the courts in the traditional common law areas or in their
role as interpreters of statutes, and, in the last two decades or so, on
those enforced by the administrative agencies and the executive
branch of government. Except as an individual lawyer has a
client whose interests are involved in a particular piece of legislation, seldom is the organized bar actively engaged in scrutinizing,
and where necessary, criticizing, the statutes which the legislature
is adopting at a particular time.
It is true that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the
American Law Institute, and various groups in the American Bar
Association and state bar organizations work on statutory revision.
Most of such efforts, however, are directed to "technical" matters
dealing with property law, contracts, and court procedures. These
are important areas, of course, and la-wyers should give even more
attention to them. On the other hand, the bar probably is the only
organized group which, over a period of centuries, will see that the
value judgments being made by the legislature are consistent with
2 See comments by Frank Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State Legislatures, COLUlliBIA LAw SCHOOL CENTENNIAL CoNFERENCE VOLUME, p. 69 (1959).
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our fundamental concepts of achieving progress and at the same
time protecting individual rights to freedom of beliefs. One individual, no matter how brave, can do little to check the excesses
of the legislatures. Only to the extent that we have safety in numbers, and can point to our long history of concern for civil liberties
(too often inadequately acted upon it is true), will we be able to preserve the principles upon which our system is built. To find and
support these values in essence is a search for a Rule of Law.
The ideas discussed here are not the only important or even
the most important aspects of a legislative Rule of Law. Nevertheless, a unifying thread of a social value judgment is involved in
all of these apparently unrelated statutes, and lawyers should recognize that the Rule of Law is being abused by such enactments,
whether or not constitutional principles are violated. We should
diligently oppose legislation dealing with subjects such as are here
discussed, although it possibly subjects us to public criticism on
the ground we are fostering irreligion, immorality, and subversion.

III.

A CAUTION ABOUT EMOTIONS

One caution about emotions is necessary. Probably each person, including the ·writer, at some point, will feel uncomfortable
because these subjects stir one's emotions. In the writer's opinion,
however, those things about which we have emotional reactions
must be recognized and we must realize that although having the
reaction is perfectly normal it is not rational to pass laws as the
result solely of these emotional responses. A case can be made that
the zealots who push too hard for the type of legislation discussed
here are fairly described as sick, at least to the extent of suffering
from what psychiatrists term "reaction formation." They probably are trying to fortify their own weak wills. This is not to suggest that all legislators who adopt such statutes, or those lawyers
hired to draft such material, are themselves sick. Our society, and
particularly the legislature, is misguided and irrational, however,
when it gives in to the incantations of such zealots whose overreaction to the evils they see or imagine in society is at least immature. Although often emotionally sympathetic with the motivation of such zealots, Ia-wyers must concern themselves with the
question of what types of legislation should be enacted and as
members of the bar we ought to protest those which we think are
inconsistent with the more basic value judgments we believe to be
important in establishing the legal rules by which we live.
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SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, FREQUENTLY HUMOROUS

A history of legislation dealing with taste in moral and political beliefs could begin at almost any point in recorded history but
possibly most significant for Americans is what happened in England. During the reign of Edward III in the 14th century the
English Parliament enacted two sumptuary laws directed against
sumptuous living. One regulated the number of courses an Englishman could serve for dinner,3 possibly to create a larger source
of funds which the King could tap for his own purposes, including
the conduct of wars. The second Edwardian taste statute dealt
with apparel.4 It provided that none but the high (and they were
also the mighty) should be so ostentatious and extravagant as to
wear fur. A quarter of a century later handball, football, cock
fighting and other games were outlawed.11
In spite of the efforts of officials of the King and the Church,
enforcement of these types of prohibitions was not effective and
Parliament repealed all apparel statutes in 1604 and rejected reenactment attempts in 1656, perhaps in part as a result of criticisms such as those expressed by John Milton in A reopagitica. 6
A new type of taste statute prohibiting blasphemy began to
appear during the 17th century in England. Directed first at use
of blasphemy in plays and shows,7 the prohibition against "pro3 BALDWIN, SUMPTUARY LEGISLATION AND PERSONAL REGULATION IN ENGLAND 24 (1926).
4 It provided that no man or woman in England, Ireland, '\Vales, or Scotland - the
King, Queen, and their children and certain nobles and churchmen only excepted, should
wear any fur in or on his clothes upon penalty of the forfeiture of the fur, and further to
be punished "by the King's will." BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 30-32. Although such
an enactment today would find some sympathy among husbands and animal lovers, in
the light of women's suffrage it would surely be politically unfeasible. In any event the
feminine glee probably is worth the pain it costs and in case of doubt the presumption
should be in favor of freedom.
6 Edward III forbade "handball, football, handy ball ..• or cockfighting" and encouraged archery (so vital to the defense of England) by requiring regular contests in the
use of the bow. BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 57. '\\Tould it not have been much
better in the long run to avoid the unenforceable negative and concentrate on the affirmative requirement?
6 Id. at 249 and 264.
7 The law was directed to "the preventing and avoiding of the great abuse of the
holy name of God in stage plays, interludes, May games, shews and such like," so that
thereafter anyone acting in a play, pageant, or similar activity must not, "jestingly or
profanely speak or use the name of God, Jesus, Christ, the Holy Ghost or the Trinity,"
and if he should do so he "should forfeit ten pounds for every offense, one-half to go to
the king, the other half to anyone who should sue in any court of record at Westminster."
Id. at 268. (Emphasis added.) As Bristol put it, "how the graceless king •.. could say
'Le Roi le veut' to it whilst he himself was swearing obscenely passes comprehension."
Ibid.
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fane swearing and cursing" was broadened in 1650.8 These statutes made use of informer's fees and graduated penalty provisions.9
The prevalence of tippling and drunkenness, even among the
clergymen,10 during this same period brought about a statute
which provided that only travelers, and artisans and laborers during their dinner hours only, were permitted to drink in inns and
alehouses.
James, like Edward III, also undertook to regulate the playing
of games and other amusements, but not without making certain
exceptions which were objectionable to the Puritans.U The
Puritans gained revenge during the Puritan Revolution, however,
and the Declaration of Sports of James I was burned and the books
were destroyed as well as all copies of the Declaration.12 Nevertheless, in general, by this time most of the original sumptuary legislation had ceased to have much, if any, effect.
The responsibility for these sumptuary laws can not be placed
on the Puritans or even on Christianity generally. Historians have
found austerity statutes enjoining the spartan life in early Greek
groups, particularly the Dorian races. In Laconia no drinking was
allowed at entertainments and no furniture was tolerated which
was more elaborate than could be made with axe and saw.13 The
Romans, as early as 215 B.C., prohibited women from possessing
more than ½ ounce of gold, or wearing a dress of different colors.14
Later the Romans went even further. In 187 B.C., laws controlled
the number of guests who could be entertained at one time, and in
161 B.C. it became illegal to serve fowl when entertaining, except
Bld. at 269.
A duke, marquis, earl, viscount, or baron was fined thirty shillings; a baronet
or knight, tlventy shillings; an esquire, ten shillings; a gentleman, six shillings, eight
penny; and all inferior persons, three shillings, four penny. It was a graduated fine in
another sense also, in that the fines were doubled from the second offense to the ninth.
The penalty was also imposed on women, if they used oaths. A wife or widow paid
according to the rank of her husband, while a single woman paid according to the rank
of her father. If the offender were a child under twelve years of age he was put in the
stocks or publicly whipped in lieu of the fine. If an anti-swearing law were enforced
rigorously today our armed forces would be reduced drastically and food would be taken
from the mouths of babes of great groups of our work force who swear frequently and with
abandon.
10 Id. at 273.
11 ld. at 272.
12 ld. at 273.
13 21 ENcvc. BRIT. 559 (14th ed. 1937). Perhaps encouragement of a spartan existence
was essential for survival and justified such enactments but these regulations soon became
only taste statutes.
14lbid.
9 lbid.
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one hen, unfattened. 16 Apparently these statutes were not attempts
merely to make good soldiers or save food.
The English were not the only people to adopt Greek and
Roman taste statutes. Such statutes were very common and extremely extensive in coverage of subjects throughout Europe during the middle ages and later. Niirnberg legally regulated extravagance of dress, particularly of "children during Holy Week,"10
and prohibited "peaks on the shoes."17 A maximum of six men
and six women guests at weddings was imposed by law,18 and the
giving of wedding gifts was severely limited.19 Those who informed on violators were protected by law against any opprobrium!
Later in Niirnberg ladies were prohibited from serenading on the
streets as part of the wedding festivities because such activities did
not "become a maiden and matronly modesty." 20 A related regulation might appeal to parents of teenagers today. It prohibited
"any but the customary dances which have come do·wn from old,"
and the dancers even then were legally prohibited from taking
"by the neck or embracing one another." 21
One N iirnberg regulation, of all things, deals with men's
clothes.22 The gradual shortening of men's outer garments, which
at first had reached the ground, outraged the sense of propriety
of those in power. The Council tried to stop the length of these
jackets at the point as far down as the arms extended but they were
not able to stem the tide of fashion. The one thing insisted on by
15 Ibid. Today one might seek to legislate against being overweight which insurance
companies say means over 145-160 pounds for a male of average height and frame. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1960, p. 25, col. 4. Surely such legislative interference today would be
unacceptable. The Marine Corps, however, is trying to achieve it by fiat. Id., Nov. 14,
1960, p. I, col. 3.
16 GREENFIED, SU!',IPTUARY I.Aw IN NURNBERG 30 (1918).
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at 34. If thirteen or more were present each was liable to a fine of ten pounds
haller, and so was the host. Ibid. Perhaps the city fathers wanted only to stop week-long
celebrations which meant the loss of productive capacity of all participants, but surely a
time limitation would have served this purpose better.
19 Id. at 41. To help in the enforcement of such provisions, the person who expected
to have a wedding in his house was required to go to the rathaus and read the laws as
written and then give his word that he and his wife would observe them.
20Id. at 63.
21 Id. at 93-94. The 15th-century rule reads as follows: "Since it has definitely come
to the knowledge of the honorable council that many unwonted shameful immodest and
novel dances are daily encouraged and practiced, which is not only a sin and without
doubt displeasing to Almighty God, but also may produce much dishonorable light-mindedness and scandal besides, among men and women, the same to prevent, our lords of the
council earnestly and strictly command, that henceforth no player or minstrel shall pipe,
play or cause any but the customary dances which have come down from old; also no one
whoever it be, woman or man, shall dance the same, and in dancing shall not take by
the neck or embrace one another. (Emphasis added.)
22 Id. at 114-115.
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the Council, however, was that the mantle should cover the fly of
men's trousers. The reason is found in the then-current fashion
to make flies of a conspicuous color contrasting with that of the
breeches, and to have the flap "stuffed and artifically enlarged."
This reaction to men's shortening jackets sounds very much like
the plaints heard today about women's necklines, only in the reverse direction. In considering how nebulous and changing are
tastes in clothes, it is worth noting that perhaps women have been
unjustly accused by men of originating such anatomical deceptions.
Sumptuary laws were common also in the great cities of
Switzerland during the Middle Ages. Invariably profanity was
regulated, and in 1520 three men were executed under ordinances
enacted during the Protestant Reformation. 23 Equally prevalent
were Sunday laws which nevertheless made exceptions for practice
by rifleshooters and users of the cross bow.24 Zurich later prohibited the giving of gloves to women who took part in christening
ceremonies25 and Basel tried to shorten funeral exercises by limiting the number of mourners and enjoining shorter funeral sermons, "especially in time of epidemic." 26
Many regulations of dress are found throughout Europe during
this period. Zurich once decreed that women of a certain class
might have silk borders on their bodices but without hooks or
buckles.27 The penalty for breach of this ordinance was confiscation or sale "for the benefit of the husband's business necessities." The incongruities of human taste are demonstrated by
the fact that the limitation on belts was not applicable to those who
belonged to the "aristocratic gilds" and to "public prostitutes." In
France, Philip IV regulated both the table and dress of his people,
and Charles V forbade long-pointed shoes.28
Historical studies of the medieval period in Europe clearly
23 VINCENT, CosruME AND CONDUcr 12 (1935).
!M Id. at 17. One provided that on Sundays

"no one may walk up and down on St.
Peter's Platz, go into secret places to play cards, or commit other wanton acts." The
exceptions indicate that the city fathers were sensitive to strong enough pressures. The
riflcshooters were to practice without noise or confusion and could not admit to their
quarters persons who came just for the eating and drinking. It surely is a safe guess that
a number of poor shooters joined.
2r; Id. at 23.
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id. at 44-45. The provision for sale for the benefit of the husband's creditors is
not completely unfamiliar to those familiar with common law doctrines regarding gifts
and fraud on creditors.
28 21 ENcYc. BRIT. 559 (14th ed. 1937). Chiropodists assert that such a ban today
would do much to lessen the discomfort and improve the disposition of people, but the
suffrage guaranteed by the 19th amendment surely precludes such interference with
women's sufferance[
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show that these "sumptuary laws were not the expression of sectaries or radicals or of men in an eddy, but of representative public
minds." 29 These early attempts of society to regulate, usually by
means of criminal statutes, what could be termed taste in moral
and religious beliefs gives the necessary historical perspective to
evaluate the place of taste legislation in modern society. Although
the examples given may seem humorous they were chosen to emphasize how obviously inappropriate was the subject matter for
legal regulation. And such regulation is not representative of only
the dark or Middle Ages. As late as 1959, the Germans completed
a revision of some 15,000 laws dating back to 1795, of which only
400 survived the revision. 30 These old laws included fines for
smoking, two years imprisonment for encouraging fellow citizens
to leave the country, and one, which put a reverse twist on the older
sumptuary laws, required the well-to-do, on pain of criminal
punishment, to use wool and linen in burying the dead. Of the
400 retained in the modern enactments most regulate matters
of property, roads, and water rights.

V.

MODERN TASTE STATUTES

Surely history teaches us that the next half millennium will
produce the same drastic change in custom and manners so that
modern taste statutes, now thought sensible by the temporary
majority, will be considered silly 500 years from now. Attempts
to freeze such tastes in statutes are not merely silly, however, they
are dangerous. Some will feel that at least a few of the laws here
discussed are improperly placed in the category of objectionable
statutes and a few may even be disturbed by the categorization.
Emotional anxiety or anger, however, is a signal to pause and think,
not a proper basis for concluding that a first and emotional reaction is a rational basis upon which a legislative judgment should
be made as to what values should be legally imposed through the
legislative process.
Because this discussion is concerned with the trend of legislative thinking as a product of the times, reference is made not to
the statute books as such, or directly to the many cases decided
daily by the courts in this country. Rather, two other sources
were chosen: The New York Times from January to June 1960,
and the Legislative Research Checklists for 1959 and 60, published
by the Council of State Governments. These sources seem more
29 GREENFIELD, SUMPTUARY LAW IN NURNBERG

so N.Y. Times, June 19, 1960, p. 20, col. I.

31 (1918).
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likely to reflect a trend of current thinking which finds its way
into statutory rules with no or little direct assistance from the bar
or the bench, except as members at large of the community. These
sources obviously are not slanted to emphasize the startling, the
lurid, or the ridiculous. Nevertheless, an interesting and disturbing story can be constructed from their staid contents.
A.

Religious Laws

One type of statute which is most ill-advised and which the
organized bar should oppose, is that dictating that Sunday shall
be a legal day of rest. For example, in June 1960,31 the Attorney
General of Maryland was asked to give an interpretation of the
Maryland statute prohibiting the making of "loud and unseemly
noises" and the doing of "bodily labor" on Sunday. His opinion
was asked as to the right to use power lawnmowers in Baltimore.
His very practical opinion indicated that they could be used on
Sunday-if they were quiet and if they did not require too much
effort to push. While he concocted a most practical opinion it
seems ludicrous that he was put in such a position. Perhaps the
moral of his ruling is: keep your machine well oiled.
Nor does one have to look far in the press to find instance after
instance of the agitation for the type of law Massachusetts recently
adopted banning sales on Sunday,32 and which the Westchester
County (New York) realty board wants to enact33 to prevent "unfair" competition from salesmen who work on Sundays. These
laws sometimes are justified on the grounds that everybody needs
a day of rest and it is convenient to pick Sunday because this is the
day on which most do take a day off. If this were really carried
to its logical extreme, why not legally adopt a five-day working
week as New Zealand has done?3 4 There the law prevents the
opening other than on Monday through Friday, of any kind of
establishment with certain very minor exceptions for emergency
purposes and one small concession to the gastronomical needs of
man allowing small dairies selling milk, ice cream and similar commodities to remain open.
We may be less than honest when we argue that a day of rest
is our concern if by that is meant a day of physical rest for purposes
of health. Our history makes it clear that these laws are a modem
p. 14, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1960, p. 66, col. 5.
Id., April 23, 1960, p. 25, col. 8.
Id., June 24, 1960, p. 30, col. 3.

31 Ann Arbor News, June 14, 1960,
32
33
84
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version of the old laws of the Middle Ages clearly enacted for
religious purposes. They found their way into the colonial laws of
this country and then into the laws of the states of this nation at
the insistence of Christians and their leaders. The Supreme Court
of the United States in its 1960 term agreed to hear a case from
Massachusetts, one from Pennsylvania, and one from Maryland
testing whether or not these so-called Sunday laws are constitutional.35 Regardless of whether or not they are constitutional
(and they are not if the Court is willing to recognize the real
motivation for such enactments) they are statutes which, as a
matter of legislative policy, should not be enacted. Such statutes
discriminate against important minorities within our own society,
whether they be of the Jewish religion, believers in the principles
of the Seventh-Day Adventist, or followers of the Moslem, the
Buddhist, or any other group. The attitude exemplified by this
type of statute is typical and is to be expected of many members of
the Christian church whether they be Catholic or Protestant.
Actually, however, such legal discrimination seems inconsistent
with true Christian principles, if Christ's peaceful moral persuasion
approach is accepted. That such laws create a substantial volume
of legal work is illustrated by a recent thirty-page annotation36
devoted solely to one aspect of the Sunday laws, that of discrimination between types of stores.
Perhaps one's first reaction to such statutes could best be summarized in the question, "How silly can we get?" This is hardly
sufficient justification, however, to object to such a law as a violation of the Rule of Law in the legislative process. The reason such
laws are passed is significant in arriving at the value judgment.
They are passed because the people who believe, in this case in
keeping the Sabbath holy, are afraid that their religious ideas will
not be or have not been accepted by the community at large.
Having failed in moral suasion, they look for legal help from the
legislature or the city council. Such laws, therefore, are indications
that the hold of the Church on the minds of men has been lost.
This type of religious discrimination and legal enforcement of one
group's moral precepts leads to the kinds of abuses which have been
seen in some countries where the Catholic Church is the only
recognized religious institution, or as in Sweden where recently a
bishop of the official state church, the Lutheran, was cited for
85 Id., April 26, 1960, p. 30, col. 4. Maryland also forbids atheists to hold public
office, id., July 13, 1960, p. 30, col. I.
86 Annot. 57 A.L.R. 2d 975 (1958).
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violation of the Swedish law because he attempted to keep the
Salvation Army from operating in one of the areas of Sweden.37
As his is the church officially recognized by the state, his action was
official action of the state. Likewise, at the present time in Sweden
there is a most serious argument within the Lutheran Church (and
therefore the state) as to whether women should be permitted to
act as members of the clergy.38
A perusal of the newspapers reveals another form of this attempt to dictate moral standards and religious beliefs which should
be precluded by the doctrine of the separation of church and state.
Jewish rabbis have protested the reading of the Bible, and probably
particularly the New Testament, as a part of the formal exercises
in public schools.39 The New York State report to the White
House Conference on Youth included a recommendation that
religious beliefs be taught in the schools as an essential ingredient
of any attempt to teach our children to be good and moral citizens.40
Again the Jewish rabbis dissented.
A similar instance of this use of the force of the state to further
religious beliefs is the concept which Professor Kauper referred to
in his discussion and which was approved by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Zorach case.41 Why do the churches
want school time or released time rather than dismissed time?
They can no longer claim that it is because the public school system takes too much of the time of the child. This argument is met
by a dismissed-time program. Instead, they want the state, through
a released-time program, to use its hold over the child (unfortunate
though it is) which it has by giving him a choice of going to religious instruction or keeping at his school work. This is a use of the
legal system which should be protested not just by rabbis but by the
legal profession itself. Aside from any question as to whether it is
constitutional, our value judgment of freedom of religious belief
and pursuit of the teachings of the group of our own choice, necessitates that the imprimatur of the state should not be placed on the
activities of any religious organization.
These religious groups seek this type of legal support because
of an emotional reaction which psychiatrists call "reaction formation." At least subconsciously they realize that their persuasive
powers have not been successful in reaching a great many of the
37N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960, p. 19, col. I.
SB Ibid.
30 Id., June

23, 1960, p. 60, col. I.
-to Id., March 24, 1960, p. 29, col. 4.
41 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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people in this country. Those who argue the most zealously for
such enactments by legislative bodies probably include those who
need these laws to reinforce their own shaky beliefs in the validity
of their concepts. In other words they are seeking to dictate to
others, as a crutch for their own beliefs that subconsciously they
are beginning to question. By working so hard to bring all types
of pressure to bear on the legislative bodies to enact these laws,
they convince themselves that they believe most strongly and so
repress the beginnings of their subconscious disbelief. To paraphrase what Christ once said, without meaning to be sacrilegious
or heretical, one might suggest that he would say something like
this, "What Caesar enacted, let Caesar enforce; what God commands, let only God enforce."
The legal system should have no quarrel with any religious
person who attempts to persuade others to abide by the rules of the
Church and observe the Sabbath. To persuade by legislation,
however, is not merely a petty annoyance, although the annoyance
is not a particularly great one. To believe that he has a legal
right to force other people to think as he does is symptomatic of a
very dangerous disease. One should have no right to control
legally the thoughts of others to bolster his own moral or political
beliefs because in the light of historical perspective more is lost
when new ideas are made dangerous and people are afraid to give
society the benefit of their new thoughts. The law should not help
reach a result involving moral beliefs which intellectual persuasion,
with complete access to the minds of men, has not achieved.

B.

Regulation of Non-political Speech and Ideas

I. Obscenity and Sex. In characterizing the subject of this
paper the term "bowdlerize" was used in a considerably broader
sense than is ordinarily meant by those who refer to the publication
of expurgated editions of books. The term derives from a Dr.
Thomas Bowdler who, in 181_8, published a "family" edition of
Shakespeare from which he had expurgated all "indelicate" passages. The term, therefore, ordinarily is used to denote deletion of
all references to sex, or at least too realistic or lusty mentions of it.
It was used before, however, to indicate a broad range of efforts
to convince ourselves that something does not exist in the mind or
feelings of man if we can just omit any reference to it, whether it
be sex, or different religious beliefs, political ideologies, or moral
standards.
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This is not the time to analyze the myriad of statutory provisions attempting to prohibit the use of obscene material.42 Nor is
it the purpose here to discuss the constitutional issue involved, although it is an important one which has not been satisfactorily
resolved. Instead, some examples of calls for censorship action as
reported in the "good grey Times" will be cited.
The Times recently reported the concern of the House of Lords
about the state of the British press.43 In this country, coincident
with the abortive Jack Paar walk-out strike, the Times carried
several news reports of meetings and speeches by members of the
television industry and of the press,44 each accusing the other of
calling the kettle black as to the emphasis on sex and violence in
the bill of fare each exhibited to its public. TV officials sanctimoniously pointed out that they had censored Paar's British w. c.
joke (wayside church or water closet, depending on whether one
is in Switzerland or Britain, so the newspapers informed us), and
newspaper spokesmen replied with that hoary defense that they
only print the news, they don't make it. Most interesting of all is
the fact that each felt it should defend its honor with regard to this
delicate subject, because, for all their brashness in treating sex and
violence, they are afraid to admit that they exploit it to line their
coffers. They do not want to call a spade a spade; they only want
to describe or show it and profit from it.
Much more important for present purposes is the report that a
Harvard University psychiatrist was charged with violation of an
obscenity statute because he imported some pornographic objects
for use in one of his classes for doctors.45 The president of Harvard
felt called on to issue a statement that Harvard stood behind the
psychiatrist in this educational use of the material.
At Illinois University, a state school, a professor was dismissed
by the president apparently for expressing in a letter to the student
newspaper the view that an argument could be made for premarital
42 There is a considerable bibliography in legal periodicals. E.g., 20 LAw &: CoNTEMP,
PROB. 531-688 (Autumn 1955); Paul &: Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on
Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 214 (1957): Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography From the Mail, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 70 (1957);
Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Oscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. R.Ev. 40 (1938); REPORT,
N.Y. STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE STUDYING THE PUBLICATION AND DISSEMINATION
OF OBJECTIONABLE AND OBSCENE MATERIALS, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 32 (1956); 33 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev.

989 (1958).
43 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1960, p. 19, col. 3.
44 E.g., Speech of Dr. Frank Stanton to the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
excerpted in the N.Y. Times, April 23, 1960, p. IO, col. 4; Gould, Tempest in a TV Tube,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1960, p. 25, col. 5.
45 N.Y. Times, April 6, 1960, p. 41, col. 6; see id., March 28, 1960, p. 46, col. 6.
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intercourse under some circumstances.46 According to the newspaper accounts, nothing of this nature was advocated by the professor in the classroom.
In Louisiana, the legislature considered a new statute dealing
with obscenity, and although it had not yet been considered by the
Senate (where all such bills have died in recent years), the news
report concluded with the statement that "so far, the bills have
aroused relatively little opposition."47 Apparently it was the
typical broad type of bill, and yet no bar group took up the cudgel
in opposition, if the newspaper report is accurate.
In New York State, the legislature considered a bill authorizing
the Motion Picture Division of the Board of Regents to place an
official seal of approval upon those motion pictures considered
suitable for children.48 Not to be outdone by state officials, a
House subcommittee in the Congress conducted extended hearings
on sexy films and advertising. 49 In addition the postal authorities
conducted a benighted campaign to warn all parents of the harm
possibly lurking in the mails if they did not watch out. A woman
staff member travelled throughout the country setting up meetings
of school officials and parents and undoubtedly giving them a thrill
by describing just how bad the material was. Many non-governmental religious and decency groups also have been organized to
combat obscenity, but our concern is with governmental action.
The drive for more rigid governmental prohibition of such
obscene material has become intense enough to draw the attention
of the American Civil Liberties Union. One of their group has
taken the position that the test of obscenity should be that the
publication is not censorable if it has "even the slightest redeeming
social importance." 50 It is easy to agree with this basic assumption
(contrary to the language in Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in the Roth51 case) that speech is speech and that it is all protected within whatever standard is applied under the first or
fourteenth amendment. What is obscene, and therefore not protected by freedom of speech and press under Mr. Justice Brennan's
definition, cannot be determined until the test of protected speech
is applied. In any event, even the ACLU admits too much censorship power.
46 Id., April 8, 1960, p. 34, col. 4.
47 Id., June 12, 1960, p. 66, col. 6.
48 Id., March 24, 1960, p. 31, col. I.
49 Id., Feb. 6, 1960, p. 11, col. 2.
50 Id., April 24, 1960, p. 72, col. 1, quoting from
51 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

the Roth case.
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Existing scientific investigation of the effect of pornographic
literature has uncovered no acceptable evidence of a causal connection between such literature and illegal action, on the part even of
the youthful.52 Although not enough evidence exists yet to be
sure there is no causal connection, all but one or two psychiatrists
who have expressed opinions on the matter have indicated they
think there is no such relationship. The burden of proof in speech
cases should remain on the prosecution to show that there is at
least some evidence indicating a danger of action resulting from the
exposure to the offensive material. No good reason exists justifying abandonment of the clear-and-present danger test, at least as a
matter of legislative policy judgment, and preferably as a constitutional test as well. This is not the place to recount the material
suggesting the complete lack of connection, but one interesting
fact found by some researchers is that juvenile delinquents do not
read very muchl 53 There is much evidence that their troubles,
if they be sexual along with others, are much more deep-seated than
can be explained by reading violent or dirty comic books. Society
should not fool itself into thinking it can in any way help remedy
the situation by passing obscenity laws.
Here again our legislatures, for fear of the political repercussions if they are accused of supporting obscenity by not supporting
the legislation banning it, have been stampeded into accepting the
offerings of the zealots who push so hard for its passage. Those
who become so emotionally involved in the suppression of such
material are not very mature psychologically or they would not get
such reactions. Probably here again is an example of a "reaction
formation."
2. General Customs and Culture. Space does not permit as
full exposition of some of the other types of statutes equally reprehensible when tested against the value judgments which should be
used in the legislative process of enacting statutes. It is important,
however, to include at least a brief mention of several of these, because they show a pattern which lawyers should come to recognize
and oppose.
The complaint of the British Lord about the quality and character of the English press included things other than sex and ob52 Lockhart &: McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
L. REv. 295, 385 (1954); A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 6, at 24
(1957); EBERHARD &: K!tONHAUSEN, PqRNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959).
53 Roman, Margolin, &: Harari, Reading Retardation and Delinquency 1 J. NAT.
PAROLE AND PROBATION Ass'N 1, 1-7 (1955).
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scenity. It referred to a general lowering of the cultural level of
the country. Reference can be made in our own country to the
New York Times series of articles or pieces by prominent people
concerning "what's wrong" as well as "what's right" with America
to find concern for our own moral standards.54 Public exchange
of correspondence between Steinbeck and Stevenson55 points to
the same kind of concern about the loss of moral fiber and national
purpose. What can happen if this kind of feeling gets reflected in
legislative enactments?
If the propriety of legislating taste is accepted, why not adopt
the British approach of placing an arbitrary limit on the showing of
United States films on TV (a government operation) to a total of
30% of the available time?56 The objection they give is that the
life depicted in our movies is most deleterious to the British culture. The Premier of Indonesia went even further by legally
banning "cha cha" type dancing in his country.57 In the United
States this kind of reaction is manifested by the violent outbursts
of parents against TV, and most parents must admit guilt to this
occasionally. In a recent conference, the head of a parents organization warned the TV industry that if they did not do something
about cleaning up their programs, parents would turn the sets off
and leave them off! 58
As a result of these complaints, the Federal Communications
Commission considered setting up a twenty-five man board to
scrutinize the program offered by TV throughout the country.50
A simple solution seems not to have occurred to the parents and
to others who object not only to TV but to the type of literature found in the book stores and the reading offered in the newspapers. Why not just refuse to buy or look at it or read it? They
54 MacLeish, supra note 1, was one of a series of articles.
65 Steinbeck & Stevenson, Our Rigged Morality, Coronet,
66 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1960, p. 31, col. 4.

March, 1960, pp. 144-47.

67 Id., Feb. 7, 1960, p. 13, col. l; and see the list of Do's and Don't's published by the
Hungarian government, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1960, p. 3, col. 4. The list included advice
such as:
- "Never rest your elbow on a person's shoulder or hat."
- "Don't write in an offensive tone to anybody; you can never be sure that the letter
will be read only by the addressee."
- "A spoon is to be used for soup and liquids."
- "After having spent an evening with a friend, don't abandon him immediately."
- "Use a napkin to wipe your mouth."
- "When you speak, it is not polite to play with the button on the other fellow's suit."
58 N.Y. Times, March 30, 1960, p. 24, col. l; id., June 27, 1960, p. 25, col. 4, reporting
an attack by religious leaders on TV exploitation of sex.
59 Id., May 21, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
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could turn the set off themselves instead of waiting for "Big
Brother" to do it. They also could refuse to patronize those sponsoring such objectionable cultural material.
Imagine the kind of mind possessed by a person who could be
hired to sit on a review board looking at television hour after hour,
day after day, and week after week! To think of the possibility of
this kind of person having the power to determine what type of
material one should see, or refuse to see, as the case may be, reminds
one of the comment Groucho Marx once made when he was invited to join a very exclusive club. He replied that he refused to
join an organization which let a person like himself become a
member.
3. Honesty. One need only look at the newspapers in this six
months to note an apparently entirely different type of moral
indignation which may lead to government action. The New
York Times alone in the past six months has carried at least fifty
items dealing with the functions of the Federal Communications
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission as they relate to
honesty in public programs and advertising. There was a much
greater public hue and cry about the rigged quiz shows and
similar entertainment contests than about false advertising about
cigarette filters, or the advertising of drugs to doctors and the
writing of articles which were really paid advertisements. One TV
network even issued orders that canned laughter used by TV
comedians would have to be announced as such.6 ° Congressional
committees concerned themselves with payola and plugola, and
have started to investigate the validity of the statistical rating services used by the networks to determine the popularity of programs. 61 One report indicated that 18 Senate and 100 House Bills
dealing with these problems had been introduced at the 1960 congressional session alone.62
To the extent that these matters deal with entertainment and
commodities related to entertainment, such as records, such concern at best is "much ado about nothing," and puts the government
needlessly in the censorship business. Nevertheless, none other
than the drafters of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code
have accepted the theory of government intervention in rigged
oo Gould, Canned TV Laughter, id. March 16, 1960, p. 75, col. I; see also N.Y. Times,
March 24, 1960, p. 29, col. 7.
61 Id., March 30, 1960, p. 43, col. 2.
62 Id., June 1, 1960, p. 63, col. 3.
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entertainment. Section 223.9 of the Mode Penal Code makes it a
crime to rig "any publicly exhibited contest." 63
Here is another example of attempts to get the legislature and
the legal system engaged in what one layman described as "noseyparkerism. "64 Enforcement of such statutes is very expensive and
probably not at all effective, no matter how much effort is expended. More important, such statutes foster an unhealthy, uncritical trust that the government will protect us against our
gullibility rather than teach us to be independently critical in our
judgments. More than likely the demand for such legislation is
caused again by a "reaction formation" much like that found in
those who promote laws which enforce certain religious and moral
beliefs.
4. Group Defamation and Group Pressure on Government
Agencies. Here again the justifiable concern of a responsible section of the community results in the imposition of artifical if not
even dangerous limitations on freedom of speech. Admittedly
these persons seek to right what most agree are wrong ideas, but
legal pressures of the kind insisted on should not be permitted. In
Queen's College in New York City recently, twenty-two faculty
members felt obliged to object to the recommendation of the City
Commission on Intergroup Relations to the effect that the president of the city colleges take disciplinary action against a student
newspaper which the Commission felt published anti-religious
statements.65 The student editors had published an article on
non-Catholic views about birth control and were criticized by the
City Commission on Intergroup Relations, although the editors
sought to run an article on the Catholic view at the same time. The
same thing is found in the criticisms by the Jewish people of the
failure of the Bavarian government to prevent the singing of Nazi
songs by members attending an old SS reunion. 66
Worst of all is the kind of action taken by the United States
Supreme Court in the famous or infamous Beauharnais case. 07
Here the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute as applied to
the White Circle League members who handed out pamphlets
asking the electorate to encourage the legislature to pass statutes
providing for segregation in housing. The pamphlet described
03 A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 11, § 223.9 (1960).
64 READ, MACDONALD & FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 761 (1959).
05 N.Y. Times, April 9, 1960, p. 2, col. 4.
66 Id., June 12, 1960, p. 85, col. 4.
67 Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 259 (1952).
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the Negro race in terms which, if applied to individuals, clearly
would be defamatory.
The assertion here is that all of these attempts are misguided
ones, resulting from a legitimate emotional reaction to past wrongs
which cannot be corrected by limitations on freedom of speech.
The same protection of free speech which allows one to argue for
desegregation or to protest against racial or religious bigotry, or
for or against birth control, should apply to those who espouse
the view with which one disagrees, no matter how abhorrent he
finds it, so long as it constitutes no substantial and imminent danger
of illegal action. The emotional desires of the minority and maligned groups are understandable, but Ia-wyers should not accept
the legislative value judgment which permits this infringement of
the rights of the people to advocate unpopular views. Members of
the bar, here as well as in the cases mentioned before, should actively oppose enactment of any such statutes. This does not mean
that the seriousness of the problem of religious bigotry should be
dismissed lightly because in Washington, D. C., in one six-weeks
period, eighty-two acts of desecration of religious building occurred. 08 Nevertheless, these problems cannot be met by preventing freedom of speech, except when clear and present danger of
action is found.
C. Regulation of Political Speech and Ideas
Another type of statute fits the same basic pattern which violates the legislative rule of law here advocated. Statutes of this type
attempt to regulate unpopular political beliefs. Space does not
permit development of the details, but a few examples should be
given. One is the refusal of Mayor Wagner of New York City to
permit the American Nazi party to hold a meeting in Union Square
on July 4. 00 The reason he gave was that the views are so unpopular
in New York that a riot might ensue, such as that suggested by the
150 people who gathered when the leader came to apply for his
license. This is like the government action involved in the
Terminiello 70 case, and equally wrong from the standpoint of the
value judgments we should insist on as part of our legislative rule
of law.
The fact that unpopular political views may cause some people
to riot is not, without more, a justification for preventing such
OBN.Y. Times, Feb. I, 1960, p. 9, col. 4.

oo Id., June 23, 1960, p. I, col. I.
70 Terminiello

v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949).
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speech or for arresting the speaker. Only if responsible government authorities have taken reasonable but unsuccessful precautions to prevent the riot should a person be prevented from expressing views calling for no illegal action. There was no charge
in either situation that the speaker was trying to arouse riotous
feelings in his audience. The riot was by those who disagreed with
the views.
The actions of private groups such as the American Legion
who succeed in holding the movie industry and some public school
boards in fear71 do not fall within the scope of the condemnation
here asserted. They are unfortunate according to the views of
many people, but this involves no legislative rule of law judgment.
One should object strenuously, however, to the modern versions of the old Sedition Acts of 1798. The idea of the Post Office
Department censoring mail from the Communist countries by
refusing to let Americans receive it is a most pathological reaction. 72 The same pathological reaction is evident in the attempts
by our government in the past to control or prevent the visits of
Americans, particularly newsmen, to Red China, at least to the
extent that such refusals are based on a fear of our people finding
out what goes on in Red China.73 If there ever was an institutional
"reaction formation" case, this is a perfect example.
One last example of misguided statutes can be cited: statutes
that deal with oaths. Statutory attempts to make those attending
schools take oaths that they do not believe in forceful overthrow
of the government, or belong to organizations which are known
to have advocated such beliefs at some time, are most misguided
efforts. In New York even high school students must take such an
oath to graduate, although it was recently waived, pending redefinition of the policy.74 A national law imposes both an oath
and an affidavit requirement upon those who receive federal scholarships to attend college. The recent action of the United States
Senate to end the student oath moves in the right direction, but not
far enough.75 Psychologically it is ·wrong to leave in the provision
about being a member of the Communist Party. If there is one
group whose exposure to the educational process should be continued, it is this very one. What better assurance is there of a
71 N.Y. Times, May 12, 1960, p. 42, col. 6; id., Feb. 15, 1960, p. 21, col. l; Crowther,
Hitting the Blacklist, id., Feb. 14, 1960, § 2, Part I, p. IX, col. 7; id., Feb. 9, 1960, p. 28,
col. l; id., Feb. 8, 1960, p. 1, col. 4; id., May 24, 1960, p. 43, col. 3.
72 ld., May 23, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
73 Id., July 1, 1960, p. 8, col. 2.
74 ld., June 23, 1960, p. 8, col. 3.
75 Id., June 16, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; id., June 6, 1960, p. 22, col. 7.
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chance to convince them of the error of the communistic beliefs
than to subject them to the kind of intellectual questioning received
from their peers and their teachers in a university in this country?
Aside from the possible pathological explanation for much of
the support for such government action, it seems to be a most useless form of activity. The proper reaction to such oaths, as legal
requirements, is epitomized by a story that appeared in the New
York Times. 76 An eight-year-old boy was being tried as a delinquent before the magistrate in London. In putting the boy under
oath, the magistrate decided he should determine whether or not
the eight-year-old understood the significance of this ritual. The
reply of the boy is a classic. When asked if he understood what it
meant to place his hand on the Bible and swear to tell the truth, he
replied: "Yes. That means that when you don't tell the truth,
everybody must still believe you." The loyalty oath does nothing
but insult and antagonize those who are loyal, because their loyalty
is questioned, and means nothing to those the oaths seek to control.
Such people have no compunctions about lying. La·wyers are badly
misled if they think that taking a formal oath means anything to
a person, other than those who, on being seriously enjoined to tell
the truth, would tell the truth anY'vay.
VI.

REACTION FORMATION AND THOUGHT CONTROL

The statutes discussed above have one common denominator basically they are "thought control" measures frequently enacted
by the legislature as a result of the pathological reaction formations
of zealots. Although the emotional reactions people have to the
matters dealt with in such statutes are neither abnormal nor unusual, the legal negative injunctions enacted as a result of such
irrational reactions almost never help solve the basic problem.
Frequently they intensify it and usually prevent identification of
more imaginative and sounder solutions.
Anthony Comstock and his successful campaign to enact the
first federal statute regulating the mailing of obscene material is
a classic example of reaction formation at work. Apparently he
was abnormally interested in women's bosoms and unconsciously
sought to repress his fear of this interest by crusading against obscenity.77 The unsuccessful struggle of many courts with the inter70 Id., March 23, 1960, p. 59, col. 2.
77Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214, 216 (1957). Comstock's diary is very revealing of the man who caused all this trouble. His reaction to the
news that it was so cold at Buchanan's inaugural festivities that the ladies all had to wear
shawls or cloaks over their low-cut ball gowns is a violently emotional outburst of righteous

598

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

pretation of the statute which Comstock got enacted has consumed
considerable valuable time and no proof exists that any immoral
thoughts have been prevented or erased by such efforts.
A recent call in England for caning of those who commit violent crimes78 and most of the resistance in this country to abolishment of capital punishment for certain crimes also are the result
of reaction formation. Subconsciously such people fear they might
lose control and commit such acts themselves, and fortify their
defense against this admission by overreacting against the one who
is caught. The same often is true of the crusader against prostitution, of some members of vice squads who seek to arrest homosexuals, and of the person who feels "called" to serve on censorship
boards. Psychiatrists in treating patients from these groups frequently find them emotionally immature or neurotically disturbed
about these very subject matters. Often they use prostitutes themselves, or are incipient homosexuals who psychologically "entrap"
those they arrest, or get a "thrill" from the obscene material they
review in the name of protecting the rest of the public; all variations on the old adage, "It takes one to catch one." To take only
one example, considering the amount of pornographic or nearpornographic material submitted to censorship boards for perusal,
clearly practically all of a member's time, spare and otherwise, is
spent reading such material. According to their own assertions, at
best they cannot but become warped personalities after service on
such boards! The interest of people in these subjects cannot be
legislated out of existence by a mere negative injunction; the cause
must be found and treated, if possible.
The proposals of parent groups and congressional committees
to regulate the television industry to assure the exposure of the
young and even adults to proper moral values only, and the consideration of enacting legal sanctions against the rigging of contests
(athletic or intellectual) and popularity ratings of records and TV
programs79 generally are manifestations of the same irrational reaction formation and equally misguided. Without suggesting approval of the rigging of contests or ratings, the anger or at least
indignation with which people react to revelation of these matters
thanksgiving that none could show their practically exposed bosoms. A psychiatrist has
little difficulty identifying this as a reaction formation.
78 N.Y. Times, March 19, 1960, p. 3, col. I. The Tories in England passed a resolution
urging caning against the entreaties of some of their leaders to wait until a study then
in progress was completed.
79 Notes 61-63 supra.
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suggests that their egos are hurt because they have been betrayed
as gullible persons with little independent judgment.
There is some expert opinion to the effect that the basic values
of the child are formed before he reaches an age when TV is meaningful to him. 80 Surely there is little to distinguish the deceit
practiced in TV wrestling from that involved in giving answers to
university professors before they appear on TV quiz shows, except
that the academic community is hurt much more by the latter
because it harbored the misguided hope that the interest of the
public in intellectual achievements on TV meant that the country
now thought university professors are people to be respected and
admired, to be idolized even. These emotional reactions are not a
rational basis for seeking the enactment of a legislative solution
with all of the paraphernalia of government, merely to assure honest
entertainment and to conceal the fact that Barnum of circus fame
was right!
Some may react with nausea or at least disgust to the insertion
of sexual overtones into political campaigns,81 but is not this merely
the result of anger aroused because a highly intellectualized version
of how a presidential candidate should be appraised is shown to
be the unrealistic view of practical politics it is? Candidates are
voted for by some because of just such unconscious appeal, but
such reactions and their influence on elections certainly cannot be
prevented by the enactment of a law prohibiting any political advertisements which "appeal to prurient interests," to borrow the
test from the Roth case majority opinion.82
Those who seek to censor political beliefs with modern versions
of the Sedition Acts probably are experiencing reaction formation
also, and legitimately may be suspected of subconsciously being
much less loyal to our ideals than they profess. The pathological
gyrations of the McCarthys and the Kaspers gave every indication
SON,Y. Times, March llO 1960, p. 24, col. I.
81 The writer had just such a reaction to an advertisement with political overtones in
the New York Times. It was a full-page picture of a closeup of Senator John Kennedy.
Very likely it aroused the maternal instincts of a good many adult women in the United
States, what with his infectious grin, rumpled hair and glasses pushed up on top of his
head, The caption in large, black type was: "Will Women Love Him or Leave Him?" In
smaller print the advertisement goes on: "One commentator says, 'The effect he has on
women is almost naughty.' And in March Ladies' Home Journal, Jack [not John you'll
notice] Kennedy himself says, 'I depend on the women in a campaign.'" It turned out to be
a magazine's advertisement plugging its March issue, but the writer's first reaction was
of nausea. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1960, p. 32, col. 2.
82 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Instead of legislating away such
emotional reactions our society must pin its hopes on signs of self-motivated maturity
such as that which perhaps is indicated by the report of the growth of the New York
Times, both in advertising and in circulation, in New York City at a rate greater than any
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to the trained psychiatrist that these super-patriots were fighting
some serious emotional problems.83 Those who decry dictatorship
so vigorously remind one of that wonderful cartoon showing
Khrushchev with foot on the rail and elbow on the bar declaring,
"I can lick anyone in this room who says that I'm not the most
peace-loving man here!" Those who have real faith in a free democracy are willing to let others be exposed to opposing thoughts.
In any event, Communism and Red China cannot be bowdlerized.
Threats do not disappear merely because one refuses to listen or
see. Fears are conquered only when faced realistically, so those who
know most about human psychology tell us. Probably the very
people who want to regulate and suppress these matters which
expose our people to the propaganda of the dictator are themselves
psychologically dictator personalities.
VII.

THE DANGERS OF TASTE STATUTES

Admittedly, society faces some serious problems in some of the
areas here discussed. Nevertheless, attempts to solve the problems
by statutes of the kind under consideration do little or no good
and are harmful for several reasons. They often breed contempt
for the law generally, because they impose standards which are
known to be substantially unenforceable. Such laws waste the time
of enforcement officers and breed dissatisfaction with the law,
among both officers and those arrested, because it is known that
the number of persons who have done the same thing without
detection probably far exceeds the number arrested. Equality in
law enforcement, although never capable of full achievement, is
by these statutes rendered obviously and ridiculously unattainable.
More importantly, these statutes impinge most seriously on our
concept of the maximum freedom of belief and speech for the individual. The ideas being huckstered by the zealot (including
the anti-zealot zealot!) always should be viewed with skepticism,
particularly when they tend to restrict the political processes by
other daily. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 12, col. 6. The public may be less gullible than
it used to be and as it becomes more sophisticated perhaps it will seek to be culture vultures
instead of materialistic status symbol seekers. In any event laws will not effect a change
which will prevent the kind of gullibility indicated by the report that one Washington,
D.C., liquor store finally labeled one of its whiskeys "Brand X" to meet the requests of its
many customers who said, "I've been hearing a lot about Brand X on TV. I'd like to try
some." N.Y. Times, May 3, 1960, p. 66, col. 7.
83 Marmor, Bernard &: Ottenberg, Psychodynamics of Group Opposition to Health
Programs, 30 AM. J. 0RTHOPSYCHIATRY, No. 2, p. 341 (April 1960). They report that
John Kasper of Clinton, Tennessee race riot fame has since led campaigns against fluoridation and the Alaska Mental Health bill.
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which legislative change is achieved.84 Taste legislation paints the
wrong picture for those nations in Asia and Africa which, we hope,
will look to us for guidance in creating a free society dedicated to
the dignity of man. The American Dream described by Mr. MacLeish can be realized only by exercising and enlarging our intellectual freedom. Is it rational to be so concerned and frightened
by what another reads or feels or thinks, so long as he takes no
action which physically affects the adult members of society without
their consent? We must learn to show more faith in our ideals
than is exhibited by such laws.
Finally, the time spent by legislatures in pursuing these fruitless tasks serves only to deter them from experimenting with more
imaginative and affirmative solutions for our social problems. The
twenty-two major bills pending in the 1960 session of Congress85
deserved the full time of our representatives without dilution by
18 Senate and 100 House bills on advertising and TV alone. 86 Similar examples are found in the various state legislatures.87 The legislative process must be used imaginatively and with as much realism and rationality as possible, which means the punitive and
negative injunctions must be minimized. The youth delinquency
problem will not be solved by making more of their actions criminal violations, yet legislative time is spent in this direction. The
pioneering approach to the narcotics problem which England has
84 See suggestion in another context by Justice Stone, United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
85 N.Y. Times, March 28, 1960, p. 14, col. 3; see also id., June 29, 1960, p. 18, col. 3.
so Note 62 supra.
87 The legislatures of the various states in the 1959 sessions officially ordered that the
following studies be made, as reported in the Legislative Research Checklist, published by
the Council of State Governments, February and May 1960: confinement of wild animals
as tourist attractions (N.C.); use of retired persons to run wild animals in their natural
habitat (Wis.); the practice of barbering (Calif., $17,500); the cost of garbage collection,
a continuation of a 1958 study (N.J.); opening of liquor establishments for sale of liquor
on Sunday (Wash.); the trading stamp industry (Mich., $1500 for House and $500 for
Senate study); same subject (Calif., $25,000); continuation of 1949 study of publication
and distribution of offensive and obscene material (N.Y., $20,000); pornographic literature
(Calif.); feasibility of conducting a space age exposition (Calif., $17,500); bill relating to
carnivals and circuses at fairs (Calif., $17,500); bill relative to kosher meats (Calif., $19,000);
bills relative to labeling vitamins and to kosher meats (Calif., $20,000); preservation of
antiquities (Md.); preservation of historic sites (N.Y., $15,000); automobile license plates
(Calif., $40,000); subliminal messages (Calif., $17,500); biils authorizing night harness
racing and prohibiting minors at horse races (Calif., $14,500); bills relative to pay television
(Calif., $15,000).
A look at a list of reports of studies actually completed does indicate that some of
the less important studies do not create waste paper in the form of a report. Many of
the studies listed here undoubtedly are worthy causes but are they worthy of serious
legislative attention? The relative monetary support given to various subjects of study
seems disproportionate at least. More important, most studies by legislative committees
make little contribution to the fundamental knowledge which will be required to solve
the problems suggested, assuming them worthy of legislative attention.
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adopted has not been tried here in spite of the evidence that establishment of official dispensaries where addicts are sustained for
pennies a day will remove all profit in illegal traffic. New solutions
to gambling must be found if the largest state in the Union finds
that this is by far its most pressing law enforcement concern.88
The problems of the poor, the chronically unemployed, the skid
row bums,-B0 and the mothers of illegitimate children90 challenge
our best efforts, all of our legislative time, and our most imaginative
minds.
Conclusion
I suggest that the Rule of Law, as applied to the legislative
process, requires that legislatures confine themselves to controlling
human actions, and desist from efforts to control taste in moral and
political beliefs, or other matters which fall in the realm of intellectual ideas. The attacks on some results of the legislative process
and criticism of those legislators who have heeded too willingly or
fearfully the incantations of the taste zealots is not predicated upon
any lack of respect for the legislative process. Rather, the criticism
is offered in the firm belief that the legislature is the ultimate determiner and therefore also the protector of our way of life, and
with the hope that its efforts can be directed toward the attainment
of the basic values of our society. If the stupid, the humorous, or
the ludicrous_ has sometimes been emphasized, it has been done
for a most serious purpose - to help the legal profession recognize
its obligation to protect the basic human values we cherish and to
recognize the ways in which they may be subtly undermined or
attacked. If this discussion does no more than stimulate thought
about these matters, it has served a substantial part of its purpose.
If it should convert readers to the point of view propounded, so
much the better.
88 N.Y. Times, April I, 1960, p.
89 Id., March 14, 1960, p. 1, col.

27, col. 2.
6.
90 Just one example of misguided legislation in the area of action (basically the sub•
ject of another discussion) will demonstrate how ridiculous we become when we emphasize
the negative instead of developing new affirmative legislative programs to solve social
welfare problems. The problem of the poor taking advantage of the aid to dependent
(usually illegitimate) children program by not getting married is a most serious one in
both North and South but how can it possibly be solved by the bill reported in the following news item? "Baton Rouge, Louisiana, June 14 (AP). The Louisiana Senate passed
a bill today to make it a crime to have more than one illegitimate child." N.Y. Times,
June 16, 1960, p. 37, col. I. Apparently the statutory prohibition applies only to women,
but even so one doubts seriously that society intends to solve the problem of support of
illegitimate children by jailing all potential mothers until it is biologically safe to return
them to society, if they have twice had children out of wedlock. For a follow-up on the
repercussions under the federal statutes of the Louisiana legislation, see story in N.Y. Times,
Nov. 16, 1960, p. 25, col. I.

